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Abstract In this paper I provide an interpretation of Kant’s conception of free 
speech. Free speech is understood as the kind of speech that is constitutive of 
interaction respectful of everybody’s right to freedom, and it requires what we with 
John Rawls may call ‘public reason.’ Public reason so understood refers to how the 
public authority must reason in order to properly specify the political relation between 
citizens. My main aim is to give us some reasons for taking a renewed interest in Kant’s 
conception of free speech, including his account of public reason. Kant’s position 
provides resources for dealing with many of the legal and political problems we 
currently struggle to analyze under this heading, such as the proper distinction between 
the sphere of justice and the sphere of ethics, hate speech, freedom of speech, defa-
mation, and the public guarantee of reliable media and universal education.
Keywords Freedom of speech • Kant on free speech • Public reason • Government 
regulation of speech
1  Introduction
Kant is a staunch defender of free speech. In fact, some see his defense of free 
speech as his sole objection to Hobbes’s absolutism, even if these same interpreters 
find it puzzling why Kant chooses free speech as the sole condition on political 
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legitimacy rather than, say, a right to life.1 Given Kant’s strong defense of free 
speech, it is also natural to think that he rejects any rightful limits on what private 
individuals can say to one another in public. Any such limitation, it seems, would 
be a limitation on free speech. At the same time, if Kant’s view really is that 
people can communicate whatever they want – no matter how hateful, harassing 
or untruthful – then it doesn’t have much to contribute to contemporary legal 
debates surrounding free speech. I will argue the contrary: a closer analysis of the 
texts in light of Kant’s theoretical commitments reveals a powerful Kantian liberal 
critique of free speech.
The argument for this new Kantian critique of the scope of constitutional protec-
tion of free speech proceeds as follows. In the first part of the paper, I focus on Kant’s 
discussion of private right – the rights private individuals hold against one another – 
as it pertains to speech. I start by exploring Kant’s general distinction between right 
and virtue. The distinction between right and virtue is crucial to understanding why 
Kant claims that most speech does not involve private wrongdoing from the point 
of view of right, regardless of what virtue might have to say. Consequently, most 
speech does not give rise to legal claims between private persons in liberal courts of 
law. I then outline those aspects of private interaction involving speech that lie within 
liberal regulation. Here I pay special attention to the Kantian treatment of threats, 
honor (including defamation), contractual lies, legal responsibility for the bad conse-
quences of lies, and noisy and startling uses of words. I argue that although there is 
private wrongdoing in each case, on Kant’s account, private individuals do not have 
the right to punish the wrongdoers. Because private individuals cannot realize 
right any punishment of private wrongdoing must be exacted by the state.
In the second part of the paper, I argue with Kant that the state sets itself up 
as a public authority, understood as a liberal legal and political system, by 
accomplishing two main tasks. First, the state secures conditions in which its 
citizens can interact rightfully as private individuals by securing their rights through 
the establishment of corresponding private and public law. Private law regulates 
private disagreements while public law copes with violent private aggression (private 
crime). Since most speech cannot give rise to private wrongdoing, the constitution 
1 See, for example, Paul Guyer, Kant (New York: Routledge, 2006); Sarah Williams Holtman, 
“Revolution, Contradiction, and Kantian Citizenship,” in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, ed. 
M. Timmons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 209; Otfried Höffe, Immanuel Kant, trans. 
Marshall Farrier (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 186f; Wolfgang Kersting, “Kant’s Concept of the 
State,” in Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. H.L Williams (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 143, though contrast with his “Politics, freedom, and order: Kant’s Political Philosophy,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press: 
1992), 342; Allen D. Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice (New York: Cornell University Press: 1993); 
Howard L. Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy (New York: St. Martin’s Press: 1983), 198. Though 
this absolutist reading of Kant is particularly encouraged by “On the Common Saying: That may 
be Correct In Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice”, especially pp. 8: 303ff, I argue against it in 
“Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy” (Kant-Studien, forthcoming). All 
references refer to the Prussian Academy pagination of Kant’s work. I have used Mary Gregor’s 
translations of The Metaphysics of Morals, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and 
of his other texts in Practical Philosophy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
41A Kantian Conception of Free Speech
both secures the citizens’ rights to be so protected by private and public law and 
protects their right to free speech. Second, the state aims to ensure that it functions as 
a representative, tripartite system of liberal law and that it reconciles its monopoly 
on coercion with the rights of each of its citizens by securing domestic, systemic 
justice. Public law is the state’s main tool for setting itself up with such an institu-
tional structure. On Kant’s view, I suggest, the way in which the state must establish 
itself as a public system of law yields a further, independent reason why liberal 
legal systems give such strong constitutional protection of free speech. Moreover, 
I argue that because of the aim to establish itself as a public system of law, the 
liberal state requires its public officials to distinguish between their official uses 
of speech and their engagement in public reason as private citizens as well as it 
regulates seditious speech. Finally, I argue that on the Kantian view, these systemic 
considerations inform the liberal state’s approach to contemporary issues such as 
hate speech, speech amounting to harassment and blackmail.
2  Virtuous Versus Rightful Private Speech
In order to understand Kant’s conception of free speech we need a good grasp of his 
conception of rightful relations in general. With this conception in hand, we can see 
how Kant conceives of rightful private speech. Then we can see how rightful private 
speech is distinguished from rightful public speech, namely that which is protected 
or outlawed by various public law measures, including free speech legislation.
Right, for Kant, is solely concerned with people’s actions in space and time, or 
what he calls our “external use of choice” (6: 213f, 224ff). When we deem each 
other and ourselves capable of deeds, meaning that we see each other and ourselves 
as the authors of our actions, we “impute” these actions to each other and to our-
selves. Such imputation, Kant argues, shows that we judge ourselves and each 
other as capable of freedom under laws with regard to external use of choice – or 
‘external freedom’ (6: 227). Moreover, when we interact, we need to enable recip-
rocal external freedom, meaning that we must find a way of interacting that is 
consistent with everybody’s external freedom. And this is where justice, or what 
Kant calls ‘right’ comes in. Right is the relation between interacting persons’ external 
freedom such that reciprocal external freedom is realized (6: 230). This is what 
Kant means when he says that rightful interactions are interactions reconcilable 
with each person’s innate right to freedom, namely the right to “independence from 
being constrained by another’s choices… insofar as it can coexist with the freedom 
of every other in accordance with a universal law” (6: 237). For Kant, right requires 
that universal laws of freedom, rather than anyone’s arbitrary choices, reciprocally 
regulate interacting individuals’ external freedom.
The first upshot of this conception of right is that anything that concerns morality 
as such is beyond its proper grasp. Right concerns only external freedom, which is 
limited to what can be hindered in space and time (coerced), whereas morality also 
requires internal freedom. That is to say, morality encompasses both right and 
virtue, and virtue requires what Kant calls freedom with regard to “internal use of 
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choice”. Internal freedom requires a person both to act on universalizable maxims 
and to do so from the motivation of duty (6: 220f) – and neither can be coercively 
enforced. This is why Kant argues that only freedom with regard to interacting 
persons’ external use of choice (right) can be coercively enforced; freedom with 
regard to both internal (virtue) and external use of choice – morality – cannot be 
coercively enforced (ibid.). Because morality requires freedom with regard to both 
internal and external use of choice, it cannot be enforced.
This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom 
explains why Kant maintains that most ways in which a person uses words in his 
interactions with others cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of 
view of right: “such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling 
or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue 
and insincere” do not constitute wrongdoing because “it is entirely up to them [the 
listeners] whether they want to believe him or not” (6: 238). The utterance of words 
in space and time does not have the power to hinder anyone else’s external freedom, 
including depriving him of his means. Since words as such cannot exert physical 
power over people, it is impossible to use them as a means of coercion against 
another. For example, if you block my way, you coerce me by hindering my move-
ments: you hinder my external freedom. If, however, you simply tell me not to 
move, you have done nothing coercive, nothing to hinder my external freedom, as 
I can simply walk passed you. So, even though by means of your words, you 
attempt to influence my internal use of choice by providing me with possible reasons 
for acting, you accomplish nothing coercive. That is, you may wish that I take on 
your proposal for action, but you do nothing to force me to do so. Whether or not 
I choose to act on your suggestion is still entirely up to me. Therefore, you cannot 
choose for me. My choice to act on your words is beyond the reach of your words, 
as is any other means I might have. Indeed, even if what you suggest is the virtuous 
thing to do, your words are powerless with regard to making me act virtuously. 
Virtuous action requires not only that I act on the right maxims, but that I also do 
so because it is the right thing to do, or from duty. Because the choice of maxims 
(internal use of choice) and duty (internal freedom) are beyond the grasp of coer-
cion, Kant holds that most uses of words, including immoral ones such as lying, 
cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right.
Three further clarifications are in order before we can see how this conception 
of virtue and right delineates the boundaries of free speech. First, even though lying 
is not a wrongdoing from the point of right, it is important to emphasize that if one 
lies, one is indeed responsible for the bad consequences of the lie. The reason is 
that by lying one voluntarily sets the framework within which another person acts. 
If the other person accepts an invitation to trust a false statement, then the bearer of 
the lie is responsible for the bad consequences of the lie. For example, say I ask you 
for directions to the library and you, due to your extraordinarily bad sense of 
humor, lie thereby sending me in the wrong direction. It happens that your lie 
directs me through the most dangerous part of town, where I become the victim of 
wrongdoing. Because your lie sets the framework within which I make my choices, 
namely the set of facts by which I make my choice, you become partly responsible 
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for what happens to me. Your words have set the framework within which I exercise 
my external freedom and consequently, even if unbeknownst to you, you send 
me into a dangerous neighborhood, you are still partly responsible for what 
happens to me there. Since the wrongdoing befell me as a result of your lie, you are 
responsible for the bad consequences resulting from it.
Second, it is important to distinguish threats of coercion from merely immoral 
speech. When you threaten me, you tell me that you do not intend to interact rightfully 
with me in the future. Simply saying so does not deprive me of anything that is mine, 
of course, but if you are serious and have the ability to make a strike against me, that 
is, if you really are threatening me, then you intend to back up your words with 
physical force. When you really threaten me, neither are you uttering ‘empty words’ 
nor are you taking yourself to be doing so. For example, assume that instead of yielding 
to your threat, I begin to walk away. You then move forward to block my retreat. 
This signals your intention to follow through with the threat. In fact, you might 
engage in other acts to signal that the threat is not empty. Perhaps you crush my hat 
under your foot or take a baseball bat to my car. In cases like these the words con-
tained in the threat no longer function merely as speech but take on the role of 
communicating an intended future wrongdoing against me. Hence, threats are not 
considered mere speech on this view.
Third, speech must be distinguished from uses of words that debilitate others in 
virtue of their causal effect on their bodies. After all, words are communicated by 
means of sound waves, which exist in space and time and hence can have coercive 
power in relation to our bodies. For example, I believe that this account affirms the 
view that if your words debilitate another’s physical functioning, whether inten-
tionally or unintentionally, there is private wrongdoing. If you standing on the edge 
of a cliff, and I sneak up behind you and say ‘Boo!’, I am responsible for the conse-
quences. In this case, it is the effect of the noise on your body, say the surprise or 
that you are startled, rather than the word (‘boo’) that hinders your external freedom, 
namely by hindering your choice to stay on the edge of the cliff. In the same 
vein, playing Herbjørg Kråkevik’s latest album extremely loudly out the windows 
of my house night and day – say, to enlighten my ignorant neighbors as to the 
benefits of listening to contemporary Norwegian folk music – has the debilitating 
effect that those close by cannot concentrate on work, relax or sleep. Ultimately, the 
extremely loud music will result in their inability to function physically. Therefore, 
also in this case my speech clearly deprives others of what is theirs, namely the 
functioning of their bodies due to the stress created by being subject to constant 
high levels of noise. Nevertheless, it is not the words or their content that 
constitutes my wrongdoing, but the noise. The point is that when such acts 
significantly affect each other’s physical ability to set and pursue ends with our 
respective means, they are coercive; such actions hinder others’ external freedom.2 
2 The analysis therefore changes if the music is not extremely loud, but merely annoying or causing 
inconvenience. In these cases, the sound waves do not have the debilitating effect I’m describing 
above. The judgment of particular cases – whether they are merely annoying, debilitating, 
intentional or non-intentional – befalls, as we will see shortly, to the public authority.
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And note that this is fully consistent with Kant’s general claim that speech as such 
is not a private wrong since the wrongdoing involved in the three cases above arises 
from the fact that there is more than speech going on.
It is because people typically cannot deprive them of what is theirs by means of 
their speech alone that most immoral uses of words, including lies, do not involve 
private wrongdoing. Instead of tracking immorality in general and lies in particular, 
private wrongdoing merely tracks the few instances in which speech alone has 
coercive power. It should therefore not come as a surprise that these instances 
involve lying and that Kant argues that there are two cases in which the general rule 
does not protect the liar: first, lying as part of contractual negotiations, and second, 
defamation. In both cases the lies have coercive power and so constitute private 
wrongdoing.
The reason contractual lies have coercive power is that if I lie when I make 
a contract with you and you believe me, then my intention is to deprive you 
non-consensually of something that is yours. For example, assuming that were 
I honest about what you will receive for your hard-earned money, I strongly suspect 
you would not contract with me, say, to buy swampland in Florida. Therefore, I lie, 
since otherwise you would not consent to the exchange. Thus, by lying I non-
consensually deprive you of something that is yours and lying as a part of contractual 
negotiations is a private wrong (6: 238, 238n).
What about defamation, how does it involve coercion? Attempts at defamation 
also constitute attempts non-consensually to deprive others of what is theirs, 
namely their good reputations as determined by their actions. Corresponding to a 
person’s innate right to freedom, Kant argues, is that person’s duty to “Be an honour-
able human being… Rightful honour… consists in asserting one’s worth as a human 
being in relation to others” (6: 236). To defend one’s rightful honor is to defend 
one’s right to be recognized by others solely by the deeds one has performed. 
Indeed, one’s reputation, Kant explains, “is an innate external belonging” (6: 295); 
it can originally belong only to the person whose deeds are in question. If others 
spread falsehoods about the life she has lived, then she has the right and duty to 
challenge their lies publicly, for her reputation belongs only to her and to no one 
else. A person’s reputation is not a means subject to other people’s choice; it is not 
a means others have a right to manipulate in order to pursue their own ends. To 
permit this, Kant argues, would be to permit others to use your person as their own 
means, or to “make yourself a mere means for others” rather than also being “at the 
same time an end for them” (6: 236).
Let me say briefly how this account of rightful honor analyzes cases like 
Holocaust-denial. Part of what makes denying the Holocaust different from 
other types of defamation is that it involves people who are no longer alive. 
On the Kantian approach I am advancing, one’s reputation is seen as intimately 
connected with how one has interacted normatively with others (6: 291). To interact 
normatively is to be capable of normativity or capable of interacting qua ‘nou-
mena’, as Kant says, and not merely ‘qua phenomena’ or as embodied beings gov-
erned by laws of nature. It is qua noumena that we are capable of deeds or of having 
actions imputed to us. And it is qua noumena that we can still be defamed long after 
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we are dead.3 Because right tracks normative relations, that one is no longer alive 
is beside the point. What is more, anyone – “relatives or strangers” – can challenge 
the lies told by another on behalf of the dead. Indeed, the one challenging the defa-
mation does so in virtue of her own duty to ensure the conditions under which we 
can have rightful honor (6: 295). The reason is that those who spread such lies do 
not only express an unwillingness to respect those they defame in particular, but also 
they display a general unwillingness to interact in a way compatible with the rightful 
honor of everyone. The absence of defamation is necessary for public opinion to be 
reconcilable with each person’s right to freedom and the corresponding duty to 
be an honorable being. By defaming the dead, a person aims to falsify the public 
opinion, upon which everyone is dependent for rightful honor. Consequently, every 
member of the public has a right to challenge such lies on behalf of the dead.4
3  Public Regulation of Speech
The above account captures the main elements in Kant’s conception of private right 
with regard to speech. Although we might expect that private law would track 
private right in liberal legal systems, we find that it doesn’t. For example, if viola-
tions of rights are judged to be coercively aggressive, then they are considered crimes 
and hence are regulated by public law – not private law. To add to the puzzle, laws 
protecting citizens’ rights to be protected by private rights against one another also 
concerns public law, namely constitutional law – not private law. To make matters 
even more confusing, notice that the previous analysis of rightful private speech 
contains no explicit mention of free speech legislation; indeed to find these laws we 
must look to public law. So how can we make sense of this from the Kantian 
3 One’s good reputation should not to be understood as “a thing”, Kant argues, but as “an innate 
external belonging, though an ideal one only, which clings to the subject as a person, a being of 
such a nature that I can and must abstract from whether he ceases to be entirely at his death or 
whether he survives as a person; for in the context of his rights in relation to others, I actually 
regard every person simply in terms of his humanity, hence as homo noumenon” 6: 295.
4 In the Doctrine of Right Kant says that defamation is not punishable by “the criminal court”, but 
only by “public opinion, which in accordance with the right of retribution, inflicts on him the same 
loss of the honor he diminishes in another”, Ibid., 6: 296n. One might be tempted to conclude that 
Kant rejects the idea that defamation is a legal issue at all. But this would be mistaken, for in 
6:295, Kant explicitly confirms that defamation after death can “take effect only in a public right-
ful condition, but… [it is] not based only on its constitution and the chosen statutes in it… [it is] 
also conceivable a priori in the state of nature and must be conceived as prior to such status, in 
order that laws in the civil constitution may afterwards be adapted to them.” Reading defamation 
to be a legal issue also gains support from this passage in the Doctrine of Virtue: “false defama-
tion… [is] to be taken before a court”, Ibid., 6: 466. Consequently, when Kant argues in the 
Doctrine of Right that defamation cases should not be taken before a criminal court, he should be 
seen as identifying the proper venue for defamation cases, namely civil (rather than criminal) 
court. And when Kant says that the punishment should be loss of honor, he means that the proper 
punishment meted out by the civil court is loss of honor.
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perspective? After all, if the above account of private wrongdoing with regard to 
speech is all the Kantian has to say about the regulation of speech, then it seems 
that she has little to contribute to many of the puzzles the free speech discussion 
gives rise to, such as public laws prohibiting seditious speech, hate speech, speech 
amounting to harassment, blackmail, and the way in which the speech of public 
officials is restricted by public law. I will argue that despite initial appearances, part 
of the strength of Kant’s approach is its ability to critique the typical structure of 
right and the additional public law restrictions of speech. The core Kantian insight 
that gives its this ability to critique, I suggest, is its proposal that free speech legis-
lation is not primarily about how private persons interact, but about citizens’ claims 
on their public institutions, including their right to criticize these institutions. 
To see how this insight is justified and how it informs the Kantian critique of free 
speech, I start by emphasizing two features distinguishing Kant’s approach to 
legal obligations from much contemporary liberal thought: first, Kant maintains 
that right is impossible in the state of nature and, second, that public right is different 
in nature from private right.
The first important distinction between Kant and much contemporary liberal 
thought issues from Kant’s argument that it is not in principle possible for individuals 
to realize right in the state of nature. Kant explicitly rejects the common assumption 
in liberal theories of his time as well as today that virtuous private individuals can 
interact in ways reconcilable both with one another’s right to freedom and their 
corresponding innate and acquired private rights. All the details of this argument 
are beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that ideal problems of assurance 
and indeterminacy regarding the specification, application and enforcement of the 
principles of private right to actual interactions lead Kant to conclude that rightful 
interaction is in principle impossible in the state of nature.5 Kant argues that only a 
public authority can solve these problems in a way reconcilable with everyone’s 
right to freedom. This is why we find Kant starting his discussion of public right 
with this claim:
however well disposed and right-loving men might be, it still lies a priori in the rational 
idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is 
established individual human beings… can never be secure against violence from one 
another, since each has her own right to do what seems right and good to her and not be 
dependent upon another’s opinion about this (6: 312).6
There are no rightful obligations in the state of nature, since in this condition might 
(‘violence’, or arbitrary judgments and ‘opinion’ about ‘what seems right and good’) 
rather than right (freedom under law) ultimately governs interactions. According to 
5 I give an interpretation of this argument in my “Kant’s Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political 
Obligations: Why Justice is Impossible in the State of Nature,” Kantian Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 
(2008): 1–45.
6 To stay faithful to Kant’s own text, I have replaced Mary Gregor’s translation of “rechtliebend” 
(‘law-abiding’) with ‘right-loving’. Moreover, Gregor uses ‘it’ instead of a ‘him’ or ‘her’ here, and 
since this is confusing, I have replaced it with ‘her.’
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Kant, therefore, only the establishment of a public authority can enable interaction 
in ways reconcilable with each person’s innate right to freedom. Moreover, only a 
public authority can ensure interaction consistent with what Kant argues are our 
innate rights (to bodily integrity and honor) and our acquired rights (to private prop-
erty, contract and status relations). The reason is that only the public authority can 
solve the problems of assurance and indeterminacy without violating anyone’s right 
to freedom. The public authority can solve these problems because it represents the 
will of all and yet the will of no one in particular. Because the public authority is 
representative in this way – by being “united a priori ” or by being an “omnilateral” 
will (6: 263) – it can regulate on behalf of everyone rather than on behalf of anyone 
in particular. For these reasons, civil society is seen as the only means through which 
our interactions can become subject to universal laws that restrict everyone’s freedom 
reciprocally rather than as subject to anyone’s arbitrary choices.
The second related distinction between Kant and much contemporary liberal 
thought concerns Kant’s explicit challenge of the (typically implicit) liberal assump-
tion that the reasoning and actions of the public authority should be thought of as 
analogous to the reasoning and actions of virtuous private individuals. This line 
of reasoning is typically assumed by both weak and strong voluntarist theories. 
On such views, ‘public reason’ is seen as referring to what virtuous individuals 
would or could hypothetically consent to. Instead, Kant proposes that the reasoning 
and actions of the public authority should be, exactly, public, meaning that any 
decisions or actions should be such that all citizens (whether virtuous or not) could 
hypothetically consent to them. To represent the citizens properly, then, the public 
authority must reason within a framework set by its citizens’ rights. This is why 
Kant emphasizes that the citizens’ hypothetical consent is understood as what 
citizens would consent to simply as citizens (6: 314).7 And as citizens their aim is 
to enable a condition in which rightful interaction, or interaction consistent with 
everyone’s right to freedom, is possible – exactly what is not possible in the state of 
nature. The perspective of the public authority is therefore not an idealized perspec-
tive of personal virtue or of private right, but rather a common public perspective 
constitutive of a rightful condition. Establishing such a public perspective to regu-
late citizens’ interactions is necessary for rightful interaction on this view.
When the state comes into being, Kant therefore argues, “[t]he general will of 
the people has united itself into a society which is to maintain itself perpetually” 
(6: 326). The state must ensure that it sets up with an institutional structure that 
enables it to remain a public authority in perpetuity. Moreover, any liberal state, 
Kant argues, is a representative republic, in which the people is the sovereign by 
governing itself through public institutions. In the just state, therefore, “law itself 
rules and depends on no particular person… Any true republic is and can only be 
7 Ibid., 6: 314. Rawls seems to share this feature with Kant. It is especially prominent in his 
later writings (Political Liberalism onwards) since there he increasingly emphasizes both the 
public aspect of his theory as well as that the theory is based on the citizens’ two moral 
capacities.
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a system representing the people, in order to protect its rights in its name, by all 
the citizens united and acting through their delegates (deputies)” (6: 341). The 
public authority comprises a liberal system of law aimed at enabling rightful inter-
action and whose officers are to be seen as the citizens’ delegates or deputies. By 
the latter point Kant does not identify democracy as a minimal condition on a 
state’s legitimacy.8 Rather what is taken to be crucial is that the public authority is 
exercised within the parameters set by a firm commitment to act on behalf of the 
citizens. The aim, therefore, is not to construct an ideally virtuous, artificial person, 
but an artificial person who represents only its citizens, and yet no one of them in 
particular. To do this, the state must be established as a representative, liberal system 
of law. Therefore, the state does or must do something private individuals cannot 
in principle do, namely act solely as a representative of the people by establishing 
itself as the liberal rule of law.
How, then, does the public authority go about establishing itself as a representa-
tive authority in the right way? One condition is that the public authority cannot 
have any private interests: it cannot own land or private property (6: 323f). If it did, 
it would simply be a powerful private person, and so would reintroduce the prob-
lems of the state of nature in its most ghastly forms. Another condition is that the 
public authority as a sovereign power must be a tripartite authority whose powers 
are delineated by the social contract (the constitution) which legislates (posits 
laws); which judges (applies the posited laws), and which determines the execu-
tion of the law (upholds a monopoly on coercion) (6: 316–318). In addition, the 
public authority’s monopoly on coercion must be reconcilable with each citizen’s 
innate right to freedom as well as her corresponding innate rights (to honor and 
bodily integrity) and acquired rights (to private property, contract and status rela-
tions). Hence, because the public authority’s primary aim is to overcome the 
problems of assurance and indeterminacy in the state of nature, and thus establish 
reciprocal freedom under law, Kant maintains that its authority must be thoroughly 
delineated by posited law that is also consistent with the “a priori necessary… 
laws… [that] follow of themselves from concepts of external right as such” 
(6: 313, cf. 6: 315). And as we have seen, this entails that posited law must be 
consistent with the a priori principles of private right. Otherwise, interaction 
cannot be reciprocal freedom subject to universal law. Making the principles of 
private right (bodily integrity, honor, property, contract and status) determinate by 
positing laws, which are applied by the courts and enforced by the executive power 
is therefore constitutive of establishing a public authority at all; its legitimacy 
requires that it enables reciprocal freedom under law in this way. In sum, then, 
constitutive of establishing a state is a legal, foundational or constitutional docu-
ment that secures each citizen her right to freedom, which includes the right to 
bodily integrity, rightful honor, private property, contract right and status relations. 
Herein lies the reason why most communications of words as such as well as 
8 Kant considers there to be three forms of state, namely autocracy (rule by one), aristocracy (rule 
by nobility) and democracy (rule by the many), (6: 340).
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virtue are beyond the proper boundaries of law: they fall outside the sphere of 
proper liberal legislation of private interaction constitutive of a legitimate public 
authority. Consequently private citizens do not have legal rights against one 
another regarding their speech, except insofar as their communications of thought are 
defamatory or are part of contractual relations, namely cases in which through 
speech we can deprive one another of rightful possessions. It is in part for this 
reason that the resulting Kantian position will defend citizens’ constitutional right 
to free speech, understood as their right to discuss even the most controversial 
topics amongst themselves – through films, articles, the media, internet medium, 
and so on. And it is in part because citizens cannot have a right to take each other 
to court on these issues that legal protection of free speech is protected by public 
law rather than private law – it is a right the citizens hold against the state rather 
than against one another. Establishing a just state involves giving its citizens a 
constitutional right to be so protected.9
It would be tempting, but wrong, to conclude from the above that a full liberal 
critique of free of speech rights found in liberal states can be established by means 
of an account derived, ultimately, from private persons’ rights against one another. 
For then Kant would be seen as arguing that constitutional protection of free speech 
is merely about ensuring that people are not punished when speech does not involve 
private wrongdoing. But Kant’s defense of free speech is much stronger than this. 
On his view, crucially, the right to free speech also protects the possibility of criticism 
of the public authority, since the right to speak out against the state is necessary for 
the public authority to be representative in nature. Therefore, this right to free 
speech is constitutive of the legitimacy of the political authority, namely constitu-
tive of the political relation itself – a relation that does not exist in the state of 
nature. The right to political speech therefore does not rely on the justification 
provided by the private right argument that words cannot coerce. This aspect of the 
right to free speech is rather seen as following from how the public authority must 
protect and facilitate its citizens’ direct, critical engagement with public, normative 
standards and practices as they pertain to right. There are no a priori solutions or 
knowledge with regard to the actual formulation of the wisest laws and policies to 
enable rightful interaction. It is only through public discussion protected by free 
speech that the public authority can reach enlightenment about how and whether its 
9 In “A Kantian Conception of Rightful Sexual Relations: Sex, (Gay) Marriage and Prostitution,” 
Social Philosophy Today, Vol. 22 (2007): 199–218, I argue that it is because citizens have a right 
to access protection by private right that gays and lesbians have a right to marriage. This is why 
same-sex marriage is a constitutional right. In “A Kantian, Feminist Conception of Abortion and 
Homosexuality,” in Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy, eds. Anita M. 
Superson and Sharon Crasnow, I argue similarly that sodomy and abortion laws are constitutional 
issues; they involve rights to bodily integrity and hence are covered in US law under the term ‘a 
right to privacy’. I employ a similar argument in “Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of Political 
Legitimacy: How Public Right ‘Concludes’ Private Right in ‘The Doctrine of Right’”, Kant 
Studien (forthcoming), to justify the claim that the legitimacy of the German state dissolved once 
it introduced laws denying private property to Jews.
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own laws and institutions really do enable reciprocal external freedom under law 
for all. That is to say, only by protecting the citizens’ right freely to express their 
often controversial and critical responses to the public authority’s operations can 
the public authority possibly take its decisions to represent the common, unified 
perspective of all its citizens. Without knowledge of how the decisions affect the 
citizens, it is simply impossible to function as a representative authority. Therefore, 
the state has the right and duty constitutionally to protect its citizens’ right to free 
speech; the right to free speech is constitutive of the rightful relation between 
citizens and their state.
There is clear textual support that Kant provides the kind of twofold defense 
of free speech argued here, namely that communication of thought does not 
typically involve private wrongdoing and that the state must protect free speech 
in order to function as a representative authority. To outlaw free speech, Kant argues 
in the essay “What is Enlightenment?”, is to “renounce enlightenment… [and] 
to violate the sacred right of humanity and trample it underfoot” (8: 39). Outlawing 
free speech is not only stupid, since it makes enlightenment or governance through 
reason impossible, but it involves denying people their right of humanity. Their 
right of humanity is denied by outlawing free speech, because such legislation 
involves using coercion against the citizens even when their speech does not 
deprive anyone of what is theirs. Moreover, outlawing free speech evidences a 
government “which misunderstands itself ” (8: 41). Similarly, Kant argues both 
in this text and in “Theory and Practice” that such legislation expresses sheer 
irrational behavior on the part of a government. “[F]reedom of the pen”, Kant writes 
in the latter essay,
is the sole palladium of the people’s rights. For to want to deny them this freedom is not 
only tantamount to taking from them any claim to a right with respect to the supreme 
commander (according to Hobbes), but is also to withhold from the latter – whose will 
gives order to the subjects as citizens only by representing the general will of the people – all 
knowledge of matters that he himself would change if he knew about them and to put him 
in contradiction with himself…. (8: 304, cf. 8: 39f)
Free speech is seen as the ultimate safeguard or protection of the people’s rights. 
Therefore, a public authority – an authority representing the will of the citizens and 
yet the will of no one in particular – cannot outlaw free speech, since citizens qua 
citizens cannot be seen as consenting to it. Such a decree would bring the sovereign 
‘in contradiction with himself’ since it would involve denying the sovereign the vital 
information it needs in order to act as the representative of the people. In “What is 
Enlightenment?” Kant expands this point: “[t]he public use of one’s reason must 
always be free… by the public use of one’s own reason I understand that use which 
someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers” 
(8: 37). Every citizen must have the right to engage truthfully, yet critically in public 
affairs – to be a scholar – and so to raise her voice and explain why she judges the 
current public system of laws to be unjust or unfair. If such voices are not raised, the 
public authority cannot possibly be able to govern wisely; without a public expres-
sion of the consequences for right of particular laws, the public authority does not 
have the information required to secure right for all and so to represent its citizens.
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Above I mentioned that the aim of the state is to establish itself as a representative, 
liberal system of law, and I also pointed out how this entails that the state must 
ensure that it rules through liberal law, understood as encompassing both private 
right measures as well as certain public right measures that enable the sovereign to 
be representative in nature. This, however, does not constitute Kant’s full discussion 
of what establishing a liberal system of law involves.10 Additional public right prin-
ciples are ‘a priori’ necessary or constitutive of a liberal system of law. These 
principles follow from the fact that the state must institutionally reconcile its 
monopoly on coercion with the rights of each of its citizens and thereby enable its 
own rightful existence in perpetuity. “Public right” refers not only to individuals’ 
rights, says Kant, but to “[t]he sum of the laws which needs to be promulgated 
generally in order to bring about a rightful condition” (6: 311). These public law 
measures essentially concern issues of systemic justice, meaning that they are seen as 
required to secure systemic right for all citizens. The main principle guiding measures 
ensuring systemic justice is simply that the state cannot allow its citizens to become 
dependent upon its monopoly on coercion unless it makes sure that the system as a 
whole is consistent with their innate right to freedom, namely their right not to be subject 
to anyone’s arbitrary choices but only be governed by universal law. The institutional 
systems upon which the citizens are dependent must respect the citizens as free, 
equal and independent in relation to one another (6: 313) – and public right is the 
main tool the state has to ensure that public institutions operate in this way.
Kant centers his discussion of systemic justice in “General Remark On the Effects 
with Regard to Rights that Follow from the Nature of the Civil Union” (6: 318). 
This section of the “Doctrine of Right” is dedicated to justifying public right 
principles as they pertain to systemic issues concerning revolution (6: 318–323); 
land ownership, the economy and the financial system (6: 323–325); poverty and 
religious institutions (6: 326–328); public offices (6: 328–330), and punishment 
(6: 331–337). Each of these principles of public right is seen as resulting from how 
the state must reconcile its monopoly on coercion with each citizens’ innate right to 
freedom, by providing conditions or establishing a systemic institutional whole in 
which citizens can interact as free, equal and independent in relation to one another. 
Rather than engage each of these public right principles here,11 I will concentrate 
on those more directly relevant to free speech, namely principles concerning 
seditious speech, punishment, public offices, and why all crimes are covered by 
public right rather than private right. Subsequently, I will treat contemporary 
issues surrounding hate speech, speech amounting to harassment, and blackmail.
10 Hence, even if the voluntarist would agree with Kant up to this point, I take it that the voluntarist 
position cannot make sense of the need for the additional provisions for systemic justice. 
Therefore, if the argument presented below succeeds, then voluntarism as it is typically under-
stood fails as a liberal approach to analyze the state’s coercive authority.
11 See my “Kant and Dependency Relations: Kant on the State’s Right to Redistribute Resources 
to Protect the Rights of Dependents”, Dialogue XLV (2006): 257–284, and “Kant’s Non-
Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy” (Kant-Studien, forthcoming) for further discussion 
of these public right principles.
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To understand Kant’s condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as 
mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state 
of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to 
have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes 
himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. 
This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does consider seditious speech a public 
crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the govern-
ment or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as 
seditious, the speaker’s intention must be to encourage and support efforts to subvert 
the government or to instigate its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have 
such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the 
means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right 
to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, 
to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might. 
Since the state is the only means through which right can replace might, the state 
outlaws it. And since it is a crime that “endanger[s] the commonwealth” rather than 
citizens qua private citizens, it is a public crime (6: 331).
The refutation of a natural executive right also explains why Kant holds that 
public right covers speech amounting to a private crime, such as a serious contrac-
tual lie. An act of aggression, or coercion, against another person is also an attempt 
to undermine the state’s rightful monopoly on coercion. Hence all violent aggres-
sions, including serious contractual lies, are crimes covered by public law – what 
we call ‘private crime laws’. They are not regulated by private law (6: 331).
Public law also governs the public authority’s administrative offices (6: 328). 
Only in this way can it subject its citizens to the authority of these offices without 
thereby subjecting them to other citizens’ (the public officers’) arbitrary choices. 
Public law regulation of public administrative offices creates the distinction 
between reasoning as a public officer and as a private citizen. Right, therefore, 
requires more than a properly functioning public reason. It also requires that public 
officers respect what Kant calls, somewhat misleadingly, the ‘private’ reasoning 
(8: 37f) constitutive of their office.12 The distinction between ‘scholarly’ or public 
reasoning qua citizen and ‘private’ reasoning qua public officer is necessary to 
reconcile the public authority’s power with each citizen’s right to freedom. Thus 
can public offices function as representative of the citizens and ensure interaction 
subject to universal laws of freedom rather than to anyone’s particular choices.
Kant’s distinction between public and private right can also be used to make 
sense of controversial issues of hate speech, speech amounting to harassment, and 
blackmail. First, an explanation why all these kinds of speech will not only be regu-
lated in relation to public spaces, but also private (non-governmental) workplaces. 
The reason why public spaces of interaction and private workplaces are equally 
12 For an excellent discussion of Kant’s distinction between private and public reason, see Jonathan 
Peterson’s “Enlightenment and Freedom,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 46, No. 2 
(April 2008): 223–244.
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important targets of public law issues from the fact that in capitalist economies, at 
least, the state has permitted its citizens to become dependent upon private employ-
ment to secure access to means and hence to exercise external freedom. Just as the 
state must ensure that all public spaces are spheres within which its citizens can 
interact as free, equal and independent bearers of rights, the state must also ensure 
that an economy on which its citizens are dependent for access to material means 
functions in the same way. That is to say, insofar as the state permits the capitalist 
system to become part of the public solution to enabling rightful private property 
for all, it must also govern that economic system by public law. The state cannot 
permit such systemic dependence without also ensuring that the systems are not 
under private control. To permit this would be to permit some private citizens to 
obtain coercive control over the freedom of other citizens, which is precisely not 
to ensure that universal law regulates all citizens’ interactions.13 Such private 
dependency relations are therefore necessarily in conflict with the state’s function, 
namely to reconcile its monopoly on coercion with each citizen’s innate right to 
freedom. The right to freedom, as we saw, is the right to independence from rather 
than dependence upon any private person’s arbitrary choices, which is realized only 
by subjecting interacting persons’ freedom reciprocally to universal laws of freedom 
as enabled by the public authority. By issuing public law to govern any systems, 
including private ones, upon which the citizens’ exercise of their rights is depen-
dent, the state secures rightful conditions for all.
Even if we accept that issues of systemic dependency explain why the state will 
regulate public spaces as well as some apparently private interactions, such as in 
the workplace, it is not immediately clear why the regulation of hate speech and 
speech amounting to harassment is necessary.14 Why are these kinds of speech not 
protected by free speech legislation – and why do they fall under public rather than 
private law? The answer lies in the way in which these kinds of speech track severe 
and pervasive historical oppression. Hate speech and harassment are exemplified by 
personal insults on the basis of factors like race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orienta-
tion, disability and socioeconomic class. Moreover, it seems that achieving the 
insult is possible only because there has been a significant history of oppression of 
the insulted person. After all, blond jokes can’t really rise to the status of insult, but 
sexist comments about my gender can.15 Still, as we saw above, the fact that speech 
is offensive or annoying is not enough to make them proper objects of law, so what 
makes these cases different?
On the Kantian view I have been developing, hate speech and speech amounting 
to harassment are not outlawed because they track private wrongdoing as such, but 
13 I think this argument applies to any private system on which the state allows its citizens to be 
dependent for the exercise of their rights.
14 Note that libertarian theories of justice have a hard time making sense of these kinds of regula-
tion. Because they are committed to the view that the rights of the state are reducible to those of 
individuals, any restrictions must be understood in terms of private harms.
15 See Ann E. Cudd, Analyzing Oppression (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) for an 
excellent discussion of these features of oppression.
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rather because they track the state’s historical and current16 inability to provide 
some group(s) of citizens with rightful conditions of interaction. This type of public 
law tries to remedy the fact that some citizens have been and still are ‘more equal 
than others’. Hence, if the state finds that it is still unable successfully to provide 
conditions under which protection and empowerment of its historically oppressed, 
and thus vulnerable, are secured, then it is within its rightful powers to legally regu-
late speech and harassment to improve its ability to do so. By putting its weight 
behind historically oppressed and vulnerable citizens, the state seeks to overcome 
the problems caused by its lack of recognition in the past and its current failure to 
provide conditions in which its citizens interact with respect for one as free and 
equal. Therefore, whether or not any instance of speech actually achieves insult is 
inconsequential, for that is not the justification for the state’s right to outlaw it. 
Rather, laws regulating speech and harassment track the state’s systemic inability 
to provide rightful interaction for all of its citizens. Note that this argument does 
not, nor must it, determine which particular usages of hate speech and speech 
amounting to harassment should be banned. It only explains why certain kinds and 
circumstances of speech and harassment can and should be outlawed and why 
public law, rather than private law, is the proper means for doing so. Determining 
which types and how it should be banned is matter for public debate and reflection 
followed by public regulation on behalf of all citizens.
Finally, why is blackmail a matter of public right?17 As we have seen above, 
private right protects each person’s right to use his own means to pursue his ends. 
Moreover, we have seen that no one has a right to anyone else’s silence. Insofar as 
I have obtained knowledge about something by rightful means, including another 
person’s history, that knowledge belongs to me. And I can make available to others 
if I so choose.18 So why can’t I offer my silence with respect to another’s history in 
exchange for some material means, such as money? The reason why I do not have 
a right to blackmail is that this kind of silence falls within the public sphere, and 
with regard to this sphere, as we have seen, all citizens must be provided conditions 
in which they can interact as free, equal and independent. Instances of blackmail 
subvert these conditions because they result in one citizen becoming dependent 
upon another for the exercise of rightful freedom. Providing conditions of rightful 
interaction precludes that one person can set ends that aim to subject another person’s 
16 As is well known, criminal statistics affirm that ethnic and religious minorities, women, gays and 
lesbians, for example, are still frequent subjects of violence – whether by private individuals or 
by public officials – merely in virtue of their ethnic, religious or gender identity and their sexual 
orientation. Naturally, the fact that violence against citizens due to their sexual orientation is not 
covered in hate crime legislation in many U.S. states does nothing to mitigate this point. Rather, 
it signals one way the state currently fails to enable conditions of rightful interaction for all of its 
citizens.
17 I am tremendously grateful to David Sussman and Arthur Ripstein for discussion on this point, 
which, of course, is not to say that they necessarily agree with my view.
18 There are some exceptions to this general rule, such as, for example, we find in doctor-patient 
and attorney-client privilege, that I cannot consider here.
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freedom to her choices in this way. Therefore, although I am permitted to make 
whatever truthful information I have about someone available to the public, perhaps 
by selling it to a newspaper or a magazine, I am not permitted to approach that 
person with an offer to exchange my silence (my means) for some of her means. 
To do so constitutes an attempt to force her into a private dependency relation with 
me, rather than to interact as free, equal and independent persons. Hence the state 
outlaws blackmail by means of public law. It is a public crime, since it endangers 
public right as such.
4  Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to show that rather than being an outdated and 
peculiar account of free speech, Kant’s position has something important and 
powerful to contribute to the current debate. I have argued that part of what makes 
Kant’s account particularly interesting to contemporary discussions issues from the 
distinctions drawn between virtue and right and between private and public right. 
These help to clarify and justify the principled distinctions that liberal law is 
currently struggling with, including distinctions between free speech, seditious 
speech, hate speech, harassment, defamation and blackmail.
